Is science materialistic?

[Sad Marsh Ghost]

I understand that some people dislike the claim on an emotional level because it challenges their basic presuppositions of the world. Nevertheless, I want to see counter arguments which purport to show how the scientific method can be possible given that science is supposed to be the product of chance, e.g., the scientist's own central nervous system is a result of a mindless process of natural selection.

I don't feel very emotional. Too dry and detached. This criticism of evolution just doesn't make any sense. There is much science cannot account for, but I can assure you that the prospect of a mindless process creating a mind is harder to 'gotcha' than this.

 

[qcrisp]

I understand that some people dislike the claim on an emotional level because it challenges their basic presuppositions of the world. Nevertheless, I want to see counter arguments which purport to show how the scientific method can be possible given that science is supposed to be the product of chance, e.g., the scientist's own central nervous system is a result of a mindless process of natural selection.

I don't feel very emotional. Too dry and detached. This criticism of evolution just doesn't make any sense. There is much science cannot account for, but I can assure you that the prospect of a mindless process creating a mind is harder to 'gotcha' than this.

I think there's a mismatch here. The criticism is about whether the scientific method can be valid in a purely material universe, not about the existence of minds per se. i.e., the question concerns how our minds can relate to some reliable structure of reality, which is what 'rationality' presupposes. The contention, also, is not that rationality is bad/suspect, etc., (if anything, the reverse); it's that the presupposition of rationality is without foundation in a purely material universe. Ergo, if we believe in rationality, we should believe there is more than matter in existence.

Having said that, I wouldn't underestimate the problem of the existence of minds. If you read the literature from innumerable contemporary philosophers trying to 'naturalise' the mind, you'll find that (almost)* no one believes we're there yet, even though most of them think that's the goal. So, one could reverse what you said: Explaining consciousness is a harder 'gotcha' than merely intoning, "Evolution."



*People like Dennett and the Churchlands (Pat and Paul) possibly disagree; I am not sure.

 

[Sad Marsh Ghost]

Well, as I said, there is much science cannot yet, or ever, explain about human consciousness, but that isn't a damnation of the scientific method or validation of monotheism. The universe is just very complicated. Far too complicated for me to think imperialist monotheism solved it.

 

[Mr. Veech]

You said that you don't judge German idealism as harshly as Santayana. What are your problems with German idealism, especially Hegelian dialectics? Given the historical context, it seemed to have evolved naturally from Kant's transcendental idealism.

I know more about Kant than Hegel, but I think Hegel's metaphysical historicism (which has inspired fascisms of both the right and the left) follows at least in some ways from his dialectics. I won't say that his dialectics is of no interest or value, but applying it as a template to history is not only false but productive of dangerous political cults.

For various reasons (some of them literary), I'm interested in abstraction, in the abstract behavior of concepts, so to speak, so I'll probably be revisiting Hegel's notion of the "concrete universal" at some point.

Kant (especially his transcendental idealism) is in the background of authors I have at times read avidly. I'm thinking especially of Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein. Also, Kant was an important influence, either negative or mixed, on the Speculative Realists. I won't go into the Speculative Realists' various critiques of "correlationism," but this is something you might want to look into if you want to read some serious philosophical objections to transcendental idealism.

I've studied "Speculative Realism" before, especially the respective work of Meillassoux and Brassier. I wouldn't say it's "serious" or groundbreaking in its critique of correlationism on the basis of ancestrality. Meillassoux's distinction between "strong" correlationism and "weak" correlationism is useful, but I don't really view the denial of the correlationist circle as anything but a convoluted excuse to return to pre-Kantian metaphysics. Was it not obvious as well as absurd to begin with that the categories of thought cannot be transcendentally grounded in a finite subject without refuting itself? I personally discovered this from my reading of Schopenhauer who tried to combine Kant's transcendental idealism with a rudimentary form of evolution.

The speculative realist, assuming he or she is a materialist, encounters the same issue the Sellarsian (left wing or right wing) encounters, namely how knowledge of brute facts is possible if they are non-conceptual in nature.

 

[Ibrahim]

Of course, it's obvious that neither the Bible nor the Koran contain a detailed description concerning the nature of human consciousness.

As perhaps expected, i would beg to differ. The Qur'anic concept of the Barzakh is perhaps siginificant in this respect.

Although, of course, science would be a description from the human point of view, and revealed scripture a description from a non-human vantage point ( Object-Oriented Ontology ? ).

Go on laugh at me.

 

[Ibrahim]

The universe is just very complicated. Far too complicated for me to think imperialist monotheism solved it.

Far from solving it, it celebrates it.

( Well, 'imperialist' monotheism doesn't solve anything. Monotheism celebrates it ( as do other non-monotheist religions, in their way. But adding more adjectives to the thing under discussion as the discussion progresses is keeping the goalposts moving rather too much. )

 

[Sad Marsh Ghost]

I actually do think it's important to remember that monotheism defeated polytheism through brute force rather than intellectual validity. There isn't any reason to champion monotheism over polytheism outside of prioritising the work of conquerors over their predecessors due to it being the done thing in society. It is strange and arbitrary to declare such an endpoint, which is why I vastly prefer science and agnostic mysticism to the parochial and dominant monotheism of whichever country the participant is from. Too much of this is down to mere national identity, which is very easy to argue against, but also uninteresting for me to debate as the status quo is so, erm, omnipresent.

 

[Acutely decayed]

Explaining consciousness is a harder 'gotcha' than merely intoning, "Evolution.".

As an approach it is what i would enable to recapitulate consciousness from scratch though (machine learning etc.), it seems important to me that we can clearly see evolution as causing consciousness, why? why should consciousness be able to scientifically explicate it's own origin in this way? surely there are any number of alternative realities where the origin of consciousness is more inexplicable to itself, is it a necessity for survival for consciousness to recognise it's genealogy? not "intoning evolution" but dissecting into this may be worthwhile I think... it genuinely intrigues me that we are able to see/detect evolution... I feel there is a revelation there.. imagine an equally self evident scientific explanation existing for our origins that we have missed, as an explanatory narrative in an alternate universe, ... seems almost inconceivable, evolution is almost omni-explanatory

 

[qcrisp]

I actually do think it's important to remember that monotheism defeated polytheism through brute force rather than intellectual validity. There isn't any reason to champion monotheism over polytheism outside of prioritising the work of conquerors over their predecessors due to it being the done thing in society. It is strange and arbitrary to declare such an endpoint, which is why I vastly prefer science and agnostic mysticism to the parochial and dominant monotheism of whichever country the participant is from. Too much of this is down to mere national identity, which is very easy to argue against, but also uninteresting for me to debate as the status quo is so, erm, omnipresent.

On what grounds are you making your first statement (your first sentence)?

I think I'd have to say that your second sentence is simply false. I've already posted a link to Xenophanes (earlier in the thread) which shows this narrative you're pushing is false.

You have denied giving emotional responses, but I think if you're going to use phrases, for instance, such as "imperialist monotheism", then the argument is an emotional one, even if you're not feeling especially excited at the moment you make it. In other words, it's based on emotional presuppositions and appeals to emotion. I would say that something to bear in mind here is that there's a difference between arguing a cultural point (between the virtues of, say, being an atheist and practicing a particular religion) and arguing a philosophical point, which is about what view gives us a clearer picture of reality.

Just for instance, it would be perfectly possible for an imperialistic-and-monotheistic culture to produce the most accurate metaphysical picture of reality. We can judge them culturally (morally and aesthetically) separately to making a judgement on their metaphysics. We might want to say that it is wrong for them to be imperialistic. But that is making a judgement of their culture, not their metaphysics. We might also want to make a case that the metaphysics and the culture are linked, but that is also a separate question and no explicit case of that kind has been made on this thread (that certain metaphysics in monotheism are conducive to imperialism, for instance; there was discussion of morality in general, of course, a while back).

On the question of being parochial, I really think you might want to be careful in the use of this word. There are all kinds of interesting correspondences between traditions from around the globe, as well as historical linkages. You might want to consider the idea that it's parochial to think that monotheism has no relevance outside the Judaeo-Christian sphere. I find myself quite able to trace the same metaphysical principles in the pre-Socratic Mediterranean world, China in the 6th Century BC and Mediaeval Christianity. (For instance.) And regarding the first-named of these three, Thomas McEvilley talks here about the links between that and Ancient India:

[ame]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OXBygl-ox5Q[/ame]

 

[gveranon]

The question in the title of this thread--Is science materialistic?--seems to have morphed into Are atheists pwned by transcendental idealism?

A less interesting question, to which the answer is obviously No.

 

[Sad Marsh Ghost]

You can't rationally argue that God certainly exists with rationalist methods of argument, citations and such, which is why I sometimes miss the 'God speaks to me and tells me he exists' or 'I just... know' arguments of yore over meandering word salads that fatigue the reader with convolutions and deflections. If God does exist then the cryptic pseudo-intellectual path to take to him seems ridiculously abstruse for what is presented as an accessible idea for all and one which their existence hinges upon.

 

[qcrisp]

Now you're just resorting to pejorative adjectives. And stating that you'd rather people didn't talk rationally about God. And if they didn't, presumably you'd discount what they said as irrational.


Come on, James, you can surely do better than this.

 

[Mr. Veech]

The question in the title of this thread--Is science materialistic?--seems to have morphed into Are atheists pwned by transcendental idealism?

A less interesting question, to which the answer is obviously No.

What a fantastic argument!

In all seriousness, either your knowledge of Kant is not that great, or you haven't been following the discussion. Proposing a transcendental argument against naturalism is not the same as arguing that transcendental idealism "defeats" atheism. Neither base naturalism nor a more refined version of naturalism influenced by Kant's transcendental idealism (e.g., Wilfrid Sellars) can account for the uniformity of nature or the reliability of the scientific method.

You would've been able to see this if you'd actually read my reply concerning Meillassoux's critique of correlationism.

 

[qcrisp]

The question in the title of this thread--Is science materialistic?--seems to have morphed into Are atheists pwned by transcendental idealism?

A less interesting question, to which the answer is obviously No.

If everything were so obvious then we might as well not discuss anything at all, which I realise is very tempting much of the time, and might even be the course of action you're suggesting(?).

On the question of the title of the thread, I plan to post something closer to that at some point when I get a bit more time. (I read some material today that might help facilitate a change of direction, at least temporarily.)

 

[qcrisp]

I will add one thing, since it's been bothering me, anyway, and it relates to the question of materialism again:

"Ergo, if we believe in rationality, we should believe there is more than matter in existence."

I wrote the above, but, of course, this falls back into the position that we know what matter is, which is one of the questions raised early on. I've been busy and still haven't finished the Stoljar (so can't, for instance, talk about his conclusions), but this concept of what materialism is seems tricky.

 

[Sad Marsh Ghost]

Now you're just resorting to pejorative adjectives. And stating that you'd rather people didn't talk rationally about God. And if they didn't, presumably you'd discount what they said as irrational.

It would probably appear irrational to me if somebody said God spoke to them, but it strikes me as more internally consistent a foundation of certain belief than attempts to rationalise certain faith in monotheism through the trappings of rational debate. Faith doesn't fit with such arguments. Wrong tool for the wrong job.

 

[qcrisp]

By the way, on the subject of parochialism:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monotheism

Even a casual perusal of this Wiki should defuse ideas that we are talking about one culture when we talk about monotheism.

Let me pick one example from the numerous ones listed there:

The Himba people of Namibia practice a form of monotheistic panentheism, and worship the god Mukuru. The deceased ancestors of the Himba and Herero are subservient to him, acting as intermediaries.

I really sometimes think that we are not speaking the same language.

So, I will leave it at that for today.

 

[Mr. Veech]

Now you're just resorting to pejorative adjectives. And stating that you'd rather people didn't talk rationally about God. And if they didn't, presumably you'd discount what they said as irrational.

It would probably appear irrational to me if somebody said God spoke to them, but it strikes me as more internally consistent a foundation of certain belief than attempts to rationalise certain faith in monotheism through the trappings of rational debate. Faith doesn't fit with such arguments. Wrong tool for the wrong job.

Right. A fideist such as Tolstoy or Wittgenstein is essentially harmless, because now there's no room for rational debate. But that's irrelevant. I haven't heard a single cogent argument from you. All I've heard so far is "monotheism is imperialistic."

 

[Sad Marsh Ghost]

I'll cope.

 

[gveranon]

In all seriousness, either your knowledge of Kant is not that great, or you haven't been following the discussion. Proposing a transcendental argument against naturalism is not the same as arguing that transcendental idealism "defeats" atheism.

I've been following the discussion.

Indeed, at one point you were out saying things like this:

I'm not saying that we should adopt theism, but I am suggesting that the five transcendental conditions I mentioned are easily accounted for under theism.

And then, a number of posts later, you arrived at this:

I have argued that the transcendental conditions governing the scientific method cannot be accounted for under atheism, which I have been using interchangeably with materialism and naturalism. By implication I am claiming that it would be problematic for someone to be both an atheist and a neuroscientist.

Apparently your overweening confidence in this claim about atheism (a term which you clearly state that you swapped in for materialism and naturalism) is based on transcendental idealism.

Yes, I've been following the discussion.

Neither base naturalism nor a more refined version of naturalism influenced by Kant's transcendental idealism (e.g., Wilfrid Sellars) can account for the uniformity of nature or the reliability of the scientific method.

You would've been able to see this if you'd actually read my reply concerning Meillassoux's critique of correlationism.

Your reply was just some bald assertions which I disagree with. I do note these sentences:

Was it not obvious as well as absurd to begin with that the categories of thought cannot be transcendentally grounded in a finite subject without refuting itself? I personally discovered this from my reading of Schopenhauer who tried to combine Kant's transcendental idealism with a rudimentary form of evolution.

So I'm not the only one simply stating that something is obvious.

On Speculative Realism, I've read far more of Harman than the others. The following probably isn't the best passage from Harman to raise the point I wish to raise, but I'm short on time and I think this will serve well enough:

"Kant's point about the finitude of human perception and cognition ought to have been broadened into a point about the finitude of fire when it burns a cotton ball without interacting with all the cotton's properties, or the finitude of rain when it strikes the tin without relating to real features of the tin that happen to be irrelevant to rain. In short, the lead distinction between thought and world must be replaced with one between objects and relations. It is this distinctly non-modern touch in OOO [Object-Oriented Ontology] that leads many modernist (and 'post'-modernist observers) to have a visceral dislike for what they wrongly regard as its bizarre personification of inaninate matter."

--Graham Harman, from Speculative Realism: An Introduction

I bolded the part above that I wanted to emphasize. Leaving aside whether OOO in all its particulars is a sound philosophy, I've been especially persuaded by Harman (after reading several of his books) that the distinction between thought and world that Kant and other modern thinkers insist on is not ontologically primary. So, no, I'm not swept away by attempted "proofs" (ha ha) based on transcendental idealism. By the way, I think Harman's use of the terms modern and modernist above is due to the influence of Latour. (Latour wrote a book titled We Have Never Been Modern that I plan to read soon.)