Is science materialistic?

[gveranon]

The question in the title of this thread--Is science materialistic?--seems to have morphed into Are atheists pwned by transcendental idealism?

A less interesting question, to which the answer is obviously No.

If everything were so obvious then we might as well not discuss anything at all, which I realise is very tempting much of the time, and might even be the course of action you're suggesting(?).

Based on years of reading and thinking, it is obvious to me. I'll concede that it may not seem obvious to everyone.

I have noticed that I never regret not getting involved in an internet argument.

On the question of the title of the thread, I plan to post something closer to that at some point when I get a bit more time. (I read some material today that might help facilitate a change of direction, at least temporarily.)

That would be welcome.

...this falls back into the position that we know what matter is, which is one of the questions raised early on. I've been busy and still haven't finished the Stoljar (so can't, for instance, talk about his conclusions), but this concept of what materialism is seems tricky.

That, to me, is a key question, and far more relevant than rhetorical strikes against Epicurus' atomism(!), etc.

 

[Mr. Veech]

@ gveranon

You might've been following the discussion, but I don't think you're that familiar with Kant. You're fixated on the term "transcendental," which simply refers to preconditions of intelligibility. Where, in my argument, have I grounded the transcendental conditions for the scientific method in Kant's synthetic unity of apperception (or unifying ego)? "Transcendental" is not synonymous with "transcendental idealism." Besides, the tradition of what in philosophy are called "transcendentals" goes back to thinkers such as Parmenides and Aristotle. Again, they refer primarily to preconditions of intelligibility, not just Kant's transcendental method as it is presented throughout The Critique of Pure Reason.

Based on your reasoning, all of phenomenology (e.g., Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty etc.) is simply Kantianism in disguise, which is what one would naturally expect if their primary knowledge of Kant as well as variations of phenomenology is derived from one or two proponents of speculative realism.

 

[Mr. Veech]

The problem actually becomes worse for the naturalist. Not only can he not provide a plausible account regarding why the scientific method is both rational and reliable, he also cannot provide a reason for why one should be rational in the first place. He cannot, in other words, offer a good explanation concerning why it's better to behave rationally within the realm of intellectual debate or within an everyday context.

Even if it were possible for the naturalist to provide such an account, it wouldn't be particularly relevant given that the naturalist is inclined to reject the reality of moral agency (or free will) due to the fact that his entire ontology is dependent upon what science, which is concerned with physical laws, says there is. But if there's no moral agency, then why bother telling people that they should only believe things on the basis of rational evidence?

-------------------------

The more naturalism is examined the more vulgar it seems as a philosophical worldview. I can't even believe I once believed it to be a respectable position.

 

[gveranon]

@ gveranon
You might've been following the discussion, but I don't think you're that familiar with Kant. You're fixated on the term "transcendental," which simply refers to preconditions of intelligibility.

I'm aware of that, but it seems to me that you've been equivocating on the connotations of the term "transcendental"--indeed, milking it for all it's worth. For you, "preconditions of intelligibility" seems to involve the superlunary sphere.

Where, in my argument, have I grounded the transcendental conditions for the scientific method in Kant's synthetic unity of apperception (or unifying ego)? "Transcendental" is not synonymous with "transcendental idealism." Besides, the tradition of what in philosophy are called "transcendentals" goes back to thinkers such as Parmenides and Aristotle. Again, they refer primarily to preconditions of intelligibility, not just Kant's transcendental method as it is presented throughout The Critique of Pure Reason.

Not saying there weren't any precursors in any way, shape, or form.

I took you to be primarily focused on Kant's transcendental method in this thread.

Based on your reasoning, all of phenomenology (e.g., Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty etc.) is simply Kantianism in disguise...

Huh?

...which is what one would naturally expect if their primary knowledge of Kant as well as variations of phenomenology is derived from one or two proponents of speculative realism.

I was reading about both Kant and phenomenology long before I'd even heard of Speculative Realism.

By the way, I enjoyed your comment upthread about Elizabeth Anscombe--that she didn't have a "strong enough philosophical background to present [her argument] in the most effective manner." I'm sure I disagree with Elizabeth Anscombe on many matters, but given the impressive biographical facts of her philosophical background, I would have felt ridiculous saying something like that. Good one!

 

[Mr. Veech]

@ gveranon

Not only did you misunderstand my argument, you didn't actually read my post regarding Lewis and Anscombe. I was referring to C.S. Lewis not having a strong philosophical background, not Anscombe. Read it again.

If you want to debate these things, then please refrain from cheap rebuttals. Accusing me of equivocation with respect to my use of the word "transcendental" along with misreading a simple statement I made will not do.

 

[gveranon]

@ gveranon
Not only did you misunderstand my argument, you didn't actually read my post regarding Lewis and Anscombe. I was referring to C.S. Lewis not having a strong philosophical background, not Anscombe. Read it again.

I apologize for the misreading concerning Anscombe/Lewis. Since you used the phrase "intelligent Christian" in the sentence following your criticism of Anscombe, it was easy to read it as referring to her, but the last sentence of your paragraph does make it clear that you're talking about Lewis.

If you want to debate these things, then please refrain from cheap rebuttals. Accusing me of equivocation with respect to my use of the word "transcendental" along with misreading a simple statement I made will not do.

Your posts in reply to me have contained a number of "cheap rebuttals" also.

 

[Mr. Veech]

@ gveranon
Not only did you misunderstand my argument, you didn't actually read my post regarding Lewis and Anscombe. I was referring to C.S. Lewis not having a strong philosophical background, not Anscombe. Read it again.

I apologize for the misreading concerning Anscombe/Lewis. Since you used the phrase "intelligent Christian" in the sentence following your criticism of Anscombe, it was easy to read it as referring to her, but the last sentence of your paragraph does make it clear that you're talking about Lewis.

If you want to debate these things, then please refrain from cheap rebuttals. Accusing me of equivocation with respect to my use of the word "transcendental" along with misreading a simple statement I made will not do.

Your posts in reply to me have contained a number of "cheap rebuttals" also.

Perhaps I've been a bit cantankerous lately due to external circumstances. I apologize.

I think the confusion that arises with respect to my use of the word "transcendental" is that it's typically used within the context of immanence. Both Kant and phenomenology use it in this manner.

I'm open to the notion that the transcendental conditions governing the scientific method have a transcendent source. The reason I'm open to this is because the attempt to ground said conditions in an immanent source leads to certain paradoxes, especially within a naturalistic framework. Speculative realism's critique of correlationism captures one aspect the problem, but it encounters a similar issue concerning how knowledge is possible if there are facts which are non-conceptual in nature (uninterpreted particulars).

Every instance of knowledge, I would argue, must imply what you might call a concrete universal.

 

[Ibrahim]

I would agree that the key ( or a most interesting ) question here is indeed ‘what is matter.’ ( And its corrolary, what is mind.)
But it seems that we should make more of an effort to keep pace with science, which is doing a fine job of defining matter & has moved along towards anti-matter in the mean time. Would that neccesitate, when we speak of dualism, positing an anti-mind as well?

Of course, i’m not entirely serious here, yet in the face of such models of matter, what models of consciousness might we compose, beyond neurons and synapses?

 

[Mr. Veech]

On perhaps a more general level, I would like to point out something else which is relevant to the question concerning whether "science is materialistic." I've been arguing that if it is, then science itself has no rational basis. Furthermore, if we accept that science is in fact rational, then materialism (which is typically used interchangeably with naturalism and atheism), is placed in serious jeopardy.

For philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle the world was, all things considered, a rational totality. Reason, in other words, did not simply belong to a finite subject (or man). And this is a perfectly good assumption to have if one believes that knowledge of the external world is in fact possible. Most contemporary schools of thought conveniently overlook the necessary "overlap" between the mind of man and the cosmos, not realizing that when they do so they're automatically delegitimizing their own position. Materialism (both old and new) is a perfect example of this.

Quentin Meillassoux, who is typically labeled a "speculative materialist," is a natural byproduct of the aforementioned problem. His critique of correlationism along with his notion of "hyper-chaos" has its beginnings in Hume's critique of induction, which was tantamount to the rejection of the necessity governing the uniformity of nature. It was assumed before Hume that the uniformity of nature was controlled by God. But that was ultimately seen as irrational, so along comes Kant. Kant believed that we can't prove God's existence, so the uniformity of nature must be a product of our own cognitive faculties, i.e., causality doesn't exist outside our own mind. Hegel comes along and notices that, given Kant's presuppositions, we can't have knowledge of the world outside our own head. Therefore, we need to expand the concept of mind so that we can have such knowledge. But Hegelian idealism eventually became too old fashioned for armchair philosophers who needed academic careers. We've had a supposed "crisis" of knowledge since Kant. We've had to endure such schools of thought as phenomenology, existentialism, structuralism, and post-structuralism (just to name a handful). But now comes along a critique of Kant by the so-called speculative realists, which is viewed by many as the latest and most "fashionable" school of thought within the realm of Continental philosophy. Their primary conclusion is the following:

"We can know objective reality apart from our direct apprehension of said reality."

Both the common man as well as the theologian already knew this. In any case, we now have Meillassoux who rejects Kantianism in every possible form through his rejection of "correlationism," which basically means that we can't really know the world outside of our subjective apprehension of it. The only problem is that now we're back where we started, namely Hume's critique of induction, which was (once again) a critique of the necessity governing the uniformity of nature. Because Meillassoux doesn't believe in God, he must now argue that the world studied by science is radically contingent, that the supposed uniformity of nature is merely a byproduct of what he calls "hyper-chaos." If we are to believe Meillassoux, then science, which includes the scientific method, has no rational basis. But Meillassoux is just one participant in this circus of ideas. We've got Zizek, who believes on the basis of Lacan and a refashioned Hegel, that human consciousness "exists" as a continual negation of the symbolic order (or language). We've got Judith Butler's "performativity theory," which is essentially identical to Sartre's ontology as it is described in Being and Nothingness. We've got Derrida, whose entire "philosophy" is based on a form of inverted Hegelianism. We've got Foucault, who convinced us that power relations were omnipresent before all else. We've got Latourian "plasmas," Lyotardian "differends," Heideggerian "unconcealments," Bataille's "base materialism," Larullelian "non-philosophies," (ad infinitum).

What instigated this long and convoluted process was the view that it is positively irrational to believe that God controlled the uniformity of nature. It was seen as more "rational" to suppose that man conditioned the external world through his own faculties (Kant). The irony, if I haven't made it sufficently clear by now, is that the rejection of the belief in God has now produced an entire marketplace of ideas which are positively irrational.

*face palm*

 

[Ibrahim]

Another problem, it seems to me, is that the gap between, for instance, physics and philosophy has broadened to such an extent that for example Kant writing that 'the green of the meadows belongs to objective sensations,' now must strike us as being not in accord with scientific knowledge. And so there, too, we find yet another addendum to what has been previously asserted: if we cannot base any of our conclusions as to the nature of matter or consciousness on philosophical traditions that got their physics wrong , so to speak, then what grounds remain on which to insist on the view that the scientific method is the truest method of inquiry, except intuition or subjective preference?

The question has been asked in numerous guises by qcrisp and mr. Veech, but still without an answer forthcoming from any quarters it seems.

@mr. Veech: i wouldn't knock Bataille, despite his nonsensical excesses; the idea of the accursed share possesses some poetic truth at least.

 

[qcrisp]

Interlude:

https://physics.weber.edu/carroll/honors/descarte.htm

http://www.shkaminski.com/Classes/Readings/Roszak10.htm

[ame]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SNl9FVJIPyY[/ame]

 

[Mr. Veech]

I've been reading the work of Cornelius Van Til, a Christian apologist who borrowed a great deal of language from German idealism to express his ideas. He boldly argued that all human knowledge presupposes the existence of the God of Scripture, and that philosophies which attempt to provide a foundation for human knowledge on the basis of "immanent" categories must utimately end in nonsense.

Here's a snippet from his Defense of the Faith:

"The point we are now concerned to stress is the atomistic character of the non-Christian methodology. The idea of system [absolute knowledge] is for it merely a limiting notion. It is merely an ideal. What is more, it must forever remain but an ideal. To become a reality this ideal would have to destroy science itself. It would have to demolish the individuality of each fact as it became known. Thus there would no longer be knowledge of a fact that is different from any other fact. The method of non-Christian science then requires that, to be known, facts must be known as part of a system. And since the Christian idea of system as due to the counsel of God is by definition excluded, it is man himself that must know this system. But to know the system he must know it untuitively. He cannot know it discursively because discursive thought, if it is to be in contact with reality at all, must partake of the piecemeal character of nonrational being. Each individual concept that pretends to be a concept with respect to things that have their existence in the world of time must partake of the de facto character of these facts themselves. In consequence each judgment or each proposition that is made by discursive thought about temporal existence is also characterized by the de facto character of temporal existence itself."

What I believe Van Til is saying is that the philosophy of the natural man presupposes the notion of absolute knowledge (or a perfectly concrete universal), but he cannot have an actual concrete universal because the very notion of absolute knowledge is determined on an immanent basis. Only a transcendent God can be said to possess absolute knowledge, which would in turn enable the scientist to know that he in fact knows anything at all. Van Til believes that a system of knowledge, if it is to be knowledge at all, presupposes an actual concrete universal which serves as the ultimate reference "point" for everything else. In other words, all facts have already been included in a system (God's knowledge) before man himself attempts to understand said facts. If that were not the case, then man would have to somehow make a brute fact "coincide" with his own categories.

I'm sorry for the Hegelese.

EDIT: One could devise a Van Tilian critique of postmodern forms of Hegelianism which begin with the actual existence of a concrete universal that is conceived in terms of immanence. All "philosophies of difference" owe their existence to Hegel.

 

[qcrisp]

As I can't sleep, I'm taking the opportunity to post some material here that I mentioned earlier that relates to the materialism question a bit more. It's from Putnam's 'Philosophy and Our Mental Life'. I've been looking into functionalism recently, and as far as I can make it out, I don't believe it works.

There's a question about whether functionalism is Aristotelian. Putnam seems to suggest that it is. I've read an essay by John Nelson recently saying that it isn't. In any case, at the moment I find Aristotle's account of the soul unsatisfactory and for similar reasons to why I find functionalism unsatisfactory.

For me, some of the reason I find them unsatisfactory can be explained via things like the 'Flying Man' thought experiment:

https://aeon.co/ideas/what-can-avicenna-teach-us-about-the-mind-body-problem

Anyway, enough of that. I will let Putnam speak:

"If it is built into one's notion of the soul that the soul can do things that violate the laws of physics, then I admit I am stumped. There cannot be a soul which is isomorphic to a brain, if the soul can read the future clairvoyantly, in a way that is not in any way explainable by physical law. On the other hand, if one is interested in more modest forms of magic like telepathy, it seems to me that there is no reason in principle why we couldn't construct a device which would project subvocalised thoughts from one brain to another. As to reincarnation, if we are, as I am urging, a certain kind of functional structure (my identity is, as it were, my functional structure), there seems to be in principle no reason why that could not be reproduced after a thousand years or a million years or a billion years. Resurrection: as you know, Christians believe in resurrection in the flesh, which completely bypasses the need for an immaterial vehicle. So even if one is interested in those questions (and they are not my concern in this paper, although I am concerned to speak to people who have those concerns), even then one doesn't need an immaterial brain or soul-stuff.

"So if I am right, and the question of matter or soul-stuff is really irrelevant to any question of philosophical or religious significance, why so much attention to it, why so much heat? The crux of the matter seems to be that both the Diderots of this world and the Descartes of this world have agreed that if we are matter, then there is a physical explanation for how we behave, disappointing or exciting. I think the traditional dualist says 'wouldn't it be terrible if we turned out to be just matter, for then there is a physical explanation for everything we do.' And the traditional materialist says 'if we are just matter, then there is a physical explanation for everything we do. Isn't that exciting!' (It is like the distinction between the optimist and the pessimist: an optimist is a person who says 'this is the best of all possible worlds'; and a pessimist is a person who says 'you're right'.)

"I think they are both wrong. I think Diderot and Descartes were both wrong in assuming that if we are matter, or our souls are material, then there is a physical explanation for our behaviour."

 

[Mr. Veech]

I think functionalism is far more versatile than eliminative materialism because it is (or at least strives to be) non-reductionistic. It's popular amongst Sellarsians (those who "follow" the work of Wilfrid Sellars). Because it's non-reductive it's been used as a way to try and explain how naturalism can include normative concepts. I personally think it's hocus-pocus, but I appreciate it's versatility compared to other physicalist approaches.

I'm not sure what Putnam means when he compares functionalism to Aristotle's (presumably) hylomorphism. The soul (or the form) of the body is inseparable from matter. Perhaps he's referring to the notion of instantiation, which is consistent with functionalism.

EDIT: I believe "instantiation" is the term Putnam likes to use. It's been some time since I read him.

 

[wingsofwax]

Donald Hoffman offers a very original view on materialism with his theory of conscious realism. It is by far the most intriguing ontological theory I've encountered. It is slightly reminiscent of Kant's transcendental idealism, but Hoffman uses a strictly scientific approach. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oadgHhdgRkI

 

[Mr. Veech]

This thread has made me confront what I already knew to be true. I believe I'm ready to finally embrace Christian theism. I'm ready to leave the swine trough of vulgar atheism, which includes philosophical pessimism. It feels glorious to finally think with my intellect as opposed to my emotions. I'm just ashamed that it took me this long.

I suppose I was afraid of ridicule. But that's patently absurd. I know I can hold my ground in terms of philosophical debate compared to the average person.

 

[bendk]

This thread has made me confront what I already knew to be true. I believe I'm ready to finally embrace Christian theism. I'm ready to leave the swine trough of vulgar atheism, which includes philosophical pessimism. It feels glorious to finally think with my intellect as opposed to my emotions. I'm just ashamed that it took me this long.

I suppose I was afraid of ridicule. But that's patently absurd. I know I can hold my ground in terms of philosophical debate compared to the average person.

LOL. (Yes, that's derisive laughter). And here I thought we rid ourselves of MS. I thought I smelled something.

 

[Sad Marsh Ghost]

This thread has made me confront what I already knew to be true. I believe I'm ready to finally embrace Christian theism. I'm ready to leave the swine trough of vulgar atheism, which includes philosophical pessimism. It feels glorious to finally think with my intellect as opposed to my emotions. I'm just ashamed that it took me this long.

I suppose I was afraid of ridicule. But that's patently absurd. I know I can hold my ground in terms of philosophical debate compared to the average person[

I'm not an antitheist and wish you well on your journey, but saying things like this is obnoxious and silly. I'm sure you're aware of the cliche of the manic woke Born Again evangelical. Spend less time saying you're clever and more time being clever.

 

[Mr. Veech]

This thread has made me confront what I already knew to be true. I believe I'm ready to finally embrace Christian theism. I'm ready to leave the swine trough of vulgar atheism, which includes philosophical pessimism. It feels glorious to finally think with my intellect as opposed to my emotions. I'm just ashamed that it took me this long.

I suppose I was afraid of ridicule. But that's patently absurd. I know I can hold my ground in terms of philosophical debate compared to the average person.

LOL. (Yes, that's derisive laughter). And here I thought we rid ourselves of MS. I thought I smelled something.

What does "MS" have to do with any of this? I'm interested in receiving an intelligent reply from you, although I suspect you'll leave your "derisive" remark and conveniently disappear.

 

[bendk]

This thread has made me confront what I already knew to be true. I believe I'm ready to finally embrace Christian theism. I'm ready to leave the swine trough of vulgar atheism, which includes philosophical pessimism. It feels glorious to finally think with my intellect as opposed to my emotions. I'm just ashamed that it took me this long.

I suppose I was afraid of ridicule. But that's patently absurd. I know I can hold my ground in terms of philosophical debate compared to the average person.

LOL. (Yes, that's derisive laughter). And here I thought we rid ourselves of MS. I thought I smelled something.

What does "MS" have to do with any of this? I'm interested in receiving an intelligent reply from you, although I suspect you'll leave your "derisive" remark and conveniently disappear.

I am sure I detected the foul stench of MS in your language. If I am wrong, I apologize. I don't think I am. You are correct in suspecting that I will not engage you in Christian apologetics. I honestly can't think of a bigger waste of time. Anyone that can look at this world and posit the idea of a benevolent god is someone I no longer have any interest in listening to. I don't have anything against deluded morons, but I have little patience with opinionated, loudmouth, deluded morons. You should note that I did not attack you for your opinions, only the way you condescendingly framed them. Keep in mind whose website you are on.