Is science materialistic?

[qcrisp]

Okay, reading back over recent comments, I think I can see how tension has mounted. Unfortunately, I have a headache and little time. These are also complicated issues, and I'm not sure where my own views fit into what has been expressed and to what extent people are managing to stay on the same frequency, anyway. I hope we can have some de-escalation, though. This thread wouldn't be as interesting without differing views.

 

[Ibrahim]

I don’t have much time; i would even go so far as to claim the contrary. But the question to what extent religion is materialist is very interesting to me.
Does that bring us into the terrain where it could be argued that for the mores as laid out by religious law need to be manifested in material existence & thus religion is materialist to an extent?

 

[Mr. Veech]

I don’t have much time; i would even go so far as to claim the contrary. But the question to what extent religion is materialist is very interesting to me.
Does that bring us into the terrain where it could be argued that for the mores as laid out by religious law need to be manifested in material existence & thus religion is materialist to an extent?

If you're talking about some form of religious theism, then I would say that it's obvious that a material realm exists. There's no reason to believe otherwise, unless one is concerned with an obscure form of idealism. "Religion" is materialist in the sense that it has made room for a material world. It does not, however, believe that the material world is self-sufficient, i.e., it cannot account for itself without descending into nonsense.

---------------------

It's disconcerting to see that this thread has suddenly devolved into caricatures of "science vs. religion" and accusations about human violence without providing actual arguments in favor of a position. I don't even know why I bother. I believe it's better at times for me to keep whatever metaphysical commitments I have to myself.

 

[Ibrahim]

I was trying to reverse the argument that both you and me have made in favour of theism, i.e. all the suppositions that materialism needs that are based in the immaterial. Likewise it could perhaps be argued that religion ( which is not the only expression of theism there is, i know ) is completely based in matter.

Hey, i’m not so convinced myself. Just trying to examine my own position from all sides...

 

[Mr. Veech]

Here's a Sellarsian/speculative realist argument which poses a problem for someone who believes in materialism and/or naturalism:

Facts that do not already have propositional content cannot be known, i.e., they remain outside the "logical space of reasons." Therefore, non-propositional facts which preceded the advent of conscious minds are ultimately unknowable. Propositional content can only be "imposed" on the material world in the same manner as Kant's transcendental idealism, which poses a sharp distinction between appearance and reality which can never be overcomed.

Naturalism, once again, cannot account for itself given its own presuppositions.

The theist does not encounter this problem. He or she can actually know the material world because facts already contain propositional content, i.e., all facts have already been interpreted by God. A finite mind is capable of "coinciding" with some aspect of an infinite intellect.

 

[Robin Davies]

if we trust science nor religion with the ethics, what is there? ( Philosophy being just another science.)

Is philosophy a science? In terms of providing good explanations of the universe, science progresses (though that may be a mixed blessing) but it seems to me that philosophy doesn't - like the arts, it proliferates and diversifies.

 

[Mr. Veech]

There's so much I wish to discuss regarding the naturalist position in philosophy, but I don't know many people who are familiar with the contemporary work of Wilfrid Sellars and his successors such as John McDowell and Robert Brandom outside of academia.

The C.S. Lewis quote qcrisp posted earlier applies to them as well. Not even the most sophisticated naturalist can overcome the issue of what one might call "the existence of non-rational facts." One must accept that all of reality is inherently rational if we are to know anything. The naturalist is doomed to epistemological ignorance if he believes there are facts outside the purview of an absolute intellect which can interpret said facts.

 

[Mr. Veech]

This will probably come off as internal rambling. Nevertheless, here goes:

[1] Naturalism, even in its contemporary form, requires the existence of "brute facts," i.e., experential data about the world which is non-conceptual. It cannot avoid what Wilfrid Sellars called "the myth of the Given."

[2] A brute fact is something which is inherently unknowable (e.g., Kant's thing-in-itself).

[3] This unknowable component of reality precludes the possibility of overcoming the distinction between appearance and reality.

[4] It's only if "the rational alone is real" (Hegel) that the appearance/reality distinction can be overcomed, i.e., we can be said to know anything outside of subjective limitations (personal or communal). An external fact must already possess conceptual content before its discovery if we are to know it as a fact.

[5] Naturalism must therefore transition into some form of idealism.

[6] If we are to have actual knowledge of the world, then the choice is between absolute idealism or theism. Either the universe possesses conceptual content in an immanent sense (i.e., it is self-sufficient), or it is dependent upon something else which transcends it, something capable of bestowing conceptual content to the external world (i.e., God).

EDIT: The fact that the naturalist cannot provide a proper foundation for the uniformity of nature is another issue that's of serious consequence to the naturalist's assumptions. Indeed, it undermines the rationality governing the scientific method.

 

[Sad Marsh Ghost]

I still don't understand why subjective mental constructs have to be justified by anything other than personal empathy and knowledge/experience. None of these word salads address that or why certainty in a single creator is sensible. Basic cultural assumptions aren't being questioned as much as the questioning of basic cultural assumptions.

The C.S. Lewis quote qcrisp posted earlier applies to them as well. Not even the most sophisticated naturalist can overcome the issue of what one might call "the existence of non-rational facts." One must accept that all of reality is inherently rational if we are to know anything. The naturalist is doomed to epistemological ignorance if he believes there are facts outside the purview of an absolute intellect which can interpret said facts.

It isn't irrational not to know something. Our origins coming from a cosmic creator and not cosmic chance fails to explain anything about the nature of reality not explored in science. To various degrees it is the scientific consensus that there is more to the universe than what our senses perceive. It isn't a monotheist idea.

 

[Mr. Veech]

@ James

With all due respect, I believe you've misinterpreted the nature of what's at stake. It is obvious that a materialist (or naturalist) possesses knowledge of the world. As a matter of fact, he knows a considerable amount. But that's not the issue. The issue is that he cannot make proper sense of his ability to know on the basis of his materialist worldview. His metaphysical commitments are incapable of grounding his epistemic claims.

So, the fact that science works is valuable proof against materialism.

 

[Ibrahim]

if we trust science nor religion with the ethics, what is there? ( Philosophy being just another science.)

Is philosophy a science? In terms of providing good explanations of the universe, science progresses (though that may be a mixed blessing) but it seems to me that philosophy doesn't - like the arts, it proliferates and diversifies.

I would go so far as to say that art is a science, even ( science just means 'knowledge,' right? ) & i object ( as somewhat of an artist myself ) to the categorization of art as some kind of embellishment ( a proliferation and diversification ) alongside a more 'practical' science.

But more to the point, i would ask why , in regards to 'explanations of the universe' there is more progress made by the one than the other. Simply supposing this to be so, in the context of this discussion, is putting the horse before the cart ; each party seems to apply a methodical probing curiosity to the world as their respective fields find it, not as a means to progress ( which would mean putting the conclusion first ) but as a means of exploration ( which would be useless without proliferation and diversification ).

 

[qcrisp]

I feel like Hume is relevant to idea that science cannot be materialistic.

I'm writing this on the fly, I'm afraid.

https://www.iep.utm.edu/hume-cau/#H5

From the 'Causal Skepticism' section:

If Hume’s account is intended to be epistemic, then the Problem of induction can be seen as taking Hume’s insights about our impressions of necessity to an extreme but reasonable conclusion. If it is true that constant conjunction (with or without the added component of mental determination) represents the totality of the content we can assign to our concept of causation, then we lose any claim to robust metaphysical necessity. But once this is lost, we also sacrifice our only rational grounding of causal inference. Our experience of constant conjunction only provides a projectivist necessity, but a projectivist necessity does not provide any obvious form of accurate predictive power. Hence, if we limit causation to the content provided by the two definitions, we cannot use this weak necessity to justify the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature and therefore cannot ground predictions. We are therefore left in a position of inductive skepticism which denies knowledge beyond memory and what is present to the senses. By limiting causation to constant conjunction, we are incapable of grounding causal inference; hence Humean inductive skepticism.

 

[Mr. Veech]

I feel like Hume is relevant to idea that science cannot be materialistic.

I'm writing this on the fly, I'm afraid.

https://www.iep.utm.edu/hume-cau/#H5

From the 'Causal Skepticism' section:

If Hume’s account is intended to be epistemic, then the Problem of induction can be seen as taking Hume’s insights about our impressions of necessity to an extreme but reasonable conclusion. If it is true that constant conjunction (with or without the added component of mental determination) represents the totality of the content we can assign to our concept of causation, then we lose any claim to robust metaphysical necessity. But once this is lost, we also sacrifice our only rational grounding of causal inference. Our experience of constant conjunction only provides a projectivist necessity, but a projectivist necessity does not provide any obvious form of accurate predictive power. Hence, if we limit causation to the content provided by the two definitions, we cannot use this weak necessity to justify the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature and therefore cannot ground predictions. We are therefore left in a position of inductive skepticism which denies knowledge beyond memory and what is present to the senses. By limiting causation to constant conjunction, we are incapable of grounding causal inference; hence Humean inductive skepticism.

Not that anyone here will care, but this problem is what led to both Kant's transcendental idealism, which in turn led to Hegel's absolute idealism. Contemporary forms of naturalism or materialism waver between Kant and Hegel on this point. The irony is that it is the "fundamentalist" theist who can provide a satisfactory answer to the question concerning the necessity governing the uniformity of nature.

"But that's not philosophical," says the philosopher.

"You lack humility," says the theologian.

 

[Sad Marsh Ghost]

It is obvious that a materialist (or naturalist) possesses knowledge of the world. As a matter of fact, he knows a considerable amount. But that's not the issue. The issue is that he cannot make proper sense of his ability to know on the basis of his materialist worldview. His metaphysical commitments are incapable of grounding his epistemic claims.

I don't think monotheism has done a good job of explaining or exploring human consciousness.

 

[Mr. Veech]

It is obvious that a materialist (or naturalist) possesses knowledge of the world. As a matter of fact, he knows a considerable amount. But that's not the issue. The issue is that he cannot make proper sense of his ability to know on the basis of his materialist worldview. His metaphysical commitments are incapable of grounding his epistemic claims.

I don't think monotheism has done a good job of explaining or exploring human consciousness.

You're still not understanding what I've been saying. Of course, it's obvious that neither the Bible nor the Koran contain a detailed description concerning the nature of human consciousness. One would have to approach the problem from various disciplines such as neuroscience and the philosophy of mind to make any progress.

However, there's nothing contradictory about a neuroscientist or a philosopher interested in the nature of human consciousness being a Christian or a Muslim. A neuroscientist can also be an atheist. But our discussions revolve around the question concerning which worldview accounts for the reliability of scientific methodology as a whole. I have argued that the transcendental conditions governing the scientific method cannot be accounted for under atheism, which I have been using interchangeably with materialism and naturalism. By implication I am claiming that it would be problematic for someone to be both an atheist and a neuroscientist.

I understand that some people dislike the claim on an emotional level because it challenges their basic presuppositions of the world. Nevertheless, I want to see counter arguments which purport to show how the scientific method can be possible given that science is supposed to be the product of chance, e.g., the scientist's own central nervous system is a result of a mindless process of natural selection.

In other words, how does natural selection as a contingent process produce the transcendental conditions governing the scientific method?

 

[qcrisp]

Funnily enough, I don't think I've looked up 'Argument from Reason' at Wikipedia before. Doing so, I find it has part of the very passage from Lewis that I quoted:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_reason

What do you make of Anscombe's criticisms?

 

[Mr. Veech]

Funnily enough, I don't think I've looked up 'Argument from Reason' at Wikipedia before. Doing so, I find it has part of the very passage from Lewis that I quoted:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argument_from_reason

What do you make of Anscombe's criticisms?

Alvin Plantinga and Cornelius Van Til make use of similar arguments. I'll post a more detailed response concerning Anscombe's criticism, but it seems to me, upon a cursory reading, that her three objections are not really persuasive.

Objection [1] is essentially a semantic issue that Lewis himself agreed with. It's not an objection to the argument itself.

Objection [2] is actually harmful to the naturalist because the supposition that we must have a standard for what constitutes a "valid" argument from an "invalid" argument before we can identify either as such cannot make sense within a naturalist framework. We're talking about syllogisms in which the conclusion must logically follow from the premises. Again, I don't see how objection [2] threatens Lewis' argument.

Objection [3] is also harmless because it reveals how much Anscombe misunderstands the argument as a whole. Lewis is advocating a worldview which includes a strong notion of teleology. To say that explanations can and must be varied is true, yet it doesn't threaten Lewis' argument because the issue is that a purely mechanistic (or non-teleological) worldview cannot support knowledge claims concerning metaphysics without being nonsensical. The very notion of "explanation" is rendered practically meaningless given naturalism.

In my opinion Anscombe's objections are not very good. This is a scenario in which an intelligent Christian put forth a good argument without, however, having a strong enough philosophical background to present it in the most effective manner. WHAT the argument says is informative, even though HOW it is said (by Lewis) is informal.

EDIT: I'm reminded of Epicurus' atoms. Imagine his "atoms" swerving in just the right manner to produce the scientific method.

 

[gveranon]

I don't judge German idealism as harshly as George Santayana did (I think it had a fruitful influence in some ways on later philosophers and littérateurs), but this passage from Santayana perfectly describes some of the posts in this thread:

"During more than twenty years, while I taught philosophy at Harvard College, I had continual occasion to read and discuss German metaphysics. From the beginning it wore in my eyes a rather questionable shape. Under its obscure and fluctuating tenets I felt something sinister at work, something at once hollow and aggressive. It seemed a forced method of speculation, producing more confusion than it found, and calculated chiefly to enable practical materialists to call themselves idealists and rationalists to remain theologians."

--George Santayana, Egotism in German Philosophy (1915)

 

[Mr. Veech]

I don't judge German idealism as harshly as George Santayana did (I think it had a fruitful influence in some ways on later philosophers and littérateurs), but this passage from Santayana perfectly describes some of the posts in this thread:

"During more than twenty years, while I taught philosophy at Harvard College, I had continual occasion to read and discuss German metaphysics. From the beginning it wore in my eyes a rather questionable shape. Under its obscure and fluctuating tenets I felt something sinister at work, something at once hollow and aggressive. It seemed a forced method of speculation, producing more confusion than it found, and calculated chiefly to enable practical materialists to call themselves idealists and rationalists to remain theologians."

--George Santayana, Egotism in German Philosophy (1915)

You said that you don't judge German idealism as harshly as Santayana. What are your problems with German idealism, especially Hegelian dialectics? Given the historical context, it seemed to have evolved naturally from Kant's transcendental idealism.

 

[gveranon]

You said that you don't judge German idealism as harshly as Santayana. What are your problems with German idealism, especially Hegelian dialectics? Given the historical context, it seemed to have evolved naturally from Kant's transcendental idealism.

I know more about Kant than Hegel, but I think Hegel's metaphysical historicism (which has inspired fascisms of both the right and the left) follows at least in some ways from his dialectics. I won't say that his dialectics is of no interest or value, but applying it as a template to history is not only false but productive of dangerous political cults.

For various reasons (some of them literary), I'm interested in abstraction, in the abstract behavior of concepts, so to speak, so I'll probably be revisiting Hegel's notion of the "concrete universal" at some point.

Kant (especially his transcendental idealism) is in the background of authors I have at times read avidly. I'm thinking especially of Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein. Also, Kant was an important influence, either negative or mixed, on the Speculative Realists. I won't go into the Speculative Realists' various critiques of "correlationism," but this is something you might want to look into if you want to read some serious philosophical objections to transcendental idealism.