Re: The Optimism Delusion - David Benatar responds to Richard Dawkins.
 

My last post here was my 666th. I was intending that to be final, but it's starting to disturb me, so I'll post one more.

Others have effectively, it seems to me, pointed out the fallacy of the unborn being deprived of something. I agree with this.

Mention was also made of morality not coming into the question of procreation, since it's all subjective. I would ask, well, where does morality come in, then? Even if everything is subjective, don't we want morality to come in somewhere? If murder (what one does with a human life) can be the subject of morality, then surely birth (what one does with a human life) also can.

While I don't think of myself as 'antinatalist', I have a great deal of sympathy with the arguments. I think people should at the very least be conscious of what they are doing when they bring people into the world, rather than just thinking, "It's all good. Everyone does it. Nothing makes a difference."

I think this is the point at which I see loose ends in antinatalism: Antinatalism, if we assume it's not based on misanthropy, must be based on compassion. But compassion only exists in those who have been born. Without those who have been born, no compassion can prevent others from being born.

This may sound strange, and not really an argument. Actually, no, it's probably not an argument - it's more my personal apprehension of how paradoxical life is.

Re: The Optimism Delusion - David Benatar responds to Richard Dawkins.
 

Apologies to everyone if I came across as aggressive in my last post. I was typing quickly and stressfully.

I think the antinatalists would be absolutely right about their position if suffering lasted forever, or even if it was constant while life lasted. But whatever suffering occurs in life, it is temporary. In the end, we'll all have the same number of chips as when we started -- zilch.

This is why I cannot accept that suffering alone is enough to determine life's worth. It is too transient and intermittent to decide matters of life and death. Personally, as a proponent of variety and experience, I believe the first is preferable, but that's just me.

Really, I think this can only be a subjective matter. In our society, we have moral authority only over our children (while they're young), and a degree of moral interference over our loved ones' lives. Hence, I find it entirely defensible and self-consistent for an antinatalist to refuse to have children, or even to tell others of the dangers of coming into existence.

As for those who decide to have children, they will in the overwhelming majority of cases care for those children more than they care for themselves. They will try their utmost to guarantee their children's happiness. And in most cases, the children will grow to find some value in the experience of life. Hence, I find it equally defensible for a couple to have children (again, as long as they do their best to look after that child).

In the end I agree, qcrisp, that the decision to have children should be extremely well thought out. I myself haven't yet decided whether to do it. All I know is that if I do bring a being into this world, I'll give my all to make that being comfortable enough to face life, and strong enough to face death. I know I may fail my child, and that it may find life Hell. But the fires of Hell will eventually be extinguished, and its hostages returned to the comfort of darkness.

Re: The Optimism Delusion - David Benatar responds to Richard Dawkins.
 

My apologies for misrepresenting your views. What I should have said was that in your argument the absence of everything includes the presence of potentiality, which is still incompatible with the metaphysics of antinatalism as I understand it. So, while I admit to wording my reply poorly, I think my critique remains sound. The example of gametes does nothing to refute it, as gametes exist in their own right prior to any growth into personhood. That said, I accept that you may not share my metaphysical intuitions, and that it would be pointless for us to just keep delineating our differences in ever finer detail.

Moving on, I too think the syllogism is flawed, not for the reason you mention, but rather because it fails on formal grounds (the second premise is too weak: it establishes a necessary condition where a sufficient condition is required). Ignoring the anachronism of propositional logic in a classical syllogism, a more correct version would be something like the following:

(i) suffering is undesirable;
(ii) subjective experience entails suffering;
(iii) therefore, subjective experience is undesirable.

You're of course free to dispute either premise, and I realise you have done so at length many times over, but do you still believe the argument has internal flaws?

I will respond to some of your other criticisms at a later time. For now let me say, in case my overbearing manner is contributing to your exasperation, that I appreciate your posts and hope to see more of them.

Re: The Optimism Delusion - David Benatar responds to Richard Dawkins.
 

Existential fallacy.

Yes, both of the premises is true, but (3) does not necessarily follow, because for something to be desirable or undesirable, the weighing of the relative benefits and disadvantages has to be taken into account.

For instance, it may be undesirable to make a 2 mile journey to the sweet shop. But what if it is more desirable to eat a sweet than it is undesirable to journey to the sweet shop? Then, overall, it is desirable to make the journey to the sweetshop.

Equally, while (2) is true, it is not the whole truth. Subjective experience entails a great deal more than just suffering.

Re: The Optimism Delusion - David Benatar responds to Richard Dawkins.
 

Kramdar, I can't bear to be misunderstood either. Well, I put up with it all the time. But to clarify: The reason I said I agree with the main part of your argument against antinatalism is that I agree with the main part of your argument against antinatalism (minus the "unborn" bit). So I had a moment of vertigo when I found myself lumped in among the antinatalists in the "All 3 of you" part of your reply.

Re: The Optimism Delusion - David Benatar responds to Richard Dawkins.
 

gveranon,

Point taken, and sorry.

I wrote that post in a delirium of frustration and admit I didn't properly read your post.

Re: The Optimism Delusion - David Benatar responds to Richard Dawkins.
 

Also guys, remember that I do not believe that an unborn being can be deprived of existence. To do so would be unbelievably stupid.

My argument, and I'll state this as clearly as I can once and for all, is that if one takes a value attributable to life -- say, experience -- and holds that value to be *objectively* Moral, then one can make the case that denying experience to the unborn is *objectively* Immoral, because it reduces the total sum of experience in the world.

That really is all I'm trying to say, though I'll admit I didn't express it well the first few times.

Re: The Optimism Delusion - David Benatar responds to Richard Dawkins.
 

How so? Just to clarify, (i) is intended to be categorical, as in "all suffering is undesirable". Don't get me wrong, I may well have messed it up; I actually can't even tell for sure. Serves me right for touting my eroded knowledge of formal logic.

That said, your refutation seems to me to hinge on extra-logical considerations. Saying that extenuating circumstances make subjective experience worthwhile is sensible, but it does indicate a willingness to compromise on the issue of suffering. So, to some extent you disagree with (i). Which is fine, but it renders the argument unpersuasive, not invalid (and I do accept that the argument may be invalid anyway, just not for this reason).

Re: The Optimism Delusion - David Benatar responds to Richard Dawkins.
 

I really don't know how to phrase it better than I did in my previous post.

An easy way to look at it is this:

Yes, (1) is not completely correct, as it fails to take into account masochism. But that's splitting hairs.

There is nothing really wrong with (2).

It is (3) that is the problem.

See, as you know, a syllogism works like this:

A is B.
B is C.
Thus, A is C.
(I know this is a simplification, but you get my point.)

Now, (1) states 'Suffering *is* Undesirable'. Nothing wrong there.

(2) states 'Subjective experience *entails* suffering'. Hmm. Getting slippery here, but it's still valid logic.

Now, here's the rub. (3) cannot have followed from (1) and (2) unless (2) stated 'Subjective experience *is* suffering', and not 'Subjective experience *entails* suffering'.

The particular affirmative ("Some of subjective experience is suffering") implied by the word 'entails' is not sufficient to establish the universal affirmative "subjective experience is undesirable".

Now, by "entails" you may have meant "subjective experience *requires* suffering", but the syllogism still fails, because the required suffering in this case does not encompass all of subjective experience, and is therefore not a universal conditional (i.e. "All subjective experiences entail suffering").

Re: The Optimism Delusion - David Benatar responds to Richard Dawkins.
 

Yes, I did have a sense I was saying something a bit different to Kramdar, which it looks like you picked up on. I'd have to go back and re-read things to be sure.